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Abstract  margins  and production  quantities associated  with
This paper analyzes a variable price support pro-  small  farms  result  in  meager  benefits  (Smith;
gram  (VPS)  as  an  alternative  to  the  current  farm  Chantfort).
income  support  program.  The  VPS  program  can  The burgeoning world production  of agricultural
control U.S.  agricultural production  while protect-  commodities  and rising  agricultural  support  pay-
ing income of small  farmers.  The VPS  is  designed  ments in the United States and the European  Com-
to alter farm level production decisions by reducing  munity  suggest  that  current  agricultural  policies
commodity  support prices  for each additional  unit  have led to an inefficient use of factors of production
of production produced.  This will  serve to discour-  and a distorted  distribution  of wealth  (Blandford;
age excess aggregate production. The VPS program  Runge; USDA, 1987). Both theory and past experi-
can be a mechanism  to stabilize income of efficient  ence indicate that a free market within the agricul-
small  farms  during the transition  from  the current  tural sector would lead to a more efficient allocation
farm  programs  to a  free market  environment.  An  of resources.  This observation has led the members
illustrative  study is used to target government  pro-  of the Organization  of Economic  Cooperation and
gram benefits to various farm-size groups.  Development (OECD) to consider domestic agricul-
tural policies in the Uruguay Round of the General-
ized Agreement on  Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  that
Key words:  variable  price support, production  con-  will improve efficiency and equity. For example, the
trol, farm program benefit,  farm size.  United  States  has  called  for  an  elimination  of  all
agricultural subsidies and a movement toward a free
m~~The~~~~~~  acmlto  ecsarclmarket  for agricultural production and distribution.
The accumulation of excess agricultural commod-  A difficulty associated  with any policy change  is
ity  supplies,  steadily  rising  government  expendi-  the impact of the change on farmers who have made
tures  on  farm  income  support  programs,  and  a  long-term plans and commitments based on current
depressed  farm  economy  characterize  the  United  policy.  Among  the expected  short-term  effects  of
States' farm economy in the 1980s (FAPRI; Knutson  removing current commodity price and income sup-
et al.). Continuous technological innovation in U. S.  port programs  are reduced commodity  production,
agricultural  production  and  an  unstable export de-  lower  output and input prices,  diminished net farm
mand  (USDA,  1987)  could result in continued  ex-  income, lower consumer food expenditures, and the
cess  production  and  depressed  farm  prices.  This  liquidation  of highly  leveraged  and  less  efficient
could  lead  to  continued  financial  stress for  many  farms  (Young  et al.). In  the long  run, removal  of
farms  and  cause  some  rural  communities  to  face  price and income supports will lead to an adjustment
increasing economic pressures.  in the agricultural  sector that will result in a more
Historically,  the  public  has  supported  the  farm  competitive farm sector and a more efficient alloca-
sector  by  funding  various  agricultural  programs.  tion  of resources  with lower production  costs  and
Although funding for these programs  has increased  higher returns on investments (Blandford).
substantially  in recent years,  many farmers,  espe-  While a more efficient  and competitive  agricul-
cially  those  on  small  farms,  are  still  faced  with  tural  sector  is  desirable,  the  shock  resulting  from
financial  hardship. This is because the current farm  such a sudden shift, especially on small farmers, will
programs  do not provide adequate income  support  have to be addressed. Consequently, an interim pol-
to  those  small  family  farms  most  affected  by  a  icy  that  provides  income  support  for  individual
depressed  agricultural  economy.  The small  profit  farmers  while  commodity  production  adjusts  to
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133market demand is needed.  This interim policy will  come, and land use. The implications  and conclu-
soften the shock associated with the policy change  sions are presented in the final section.
while ultimately  leading  to benefits from  the rein-
troduction of a competitive market to agriculture.  R  PR  PP
Given  these considerations,  an alternate  agricul-
tural  income  support program  that could be  used  The basic reasoning underlying  the use of a VPS
during the transition to a free market (i.e., a market  can be compared to the logic used in the increasing
unimpeded  by  government  intervention)  is  dis-  rate  structure  used by electrical  power  companies
cussed  and  analyzed  in  this  paper.  The program  (or water authorities). While the utility rate schedule
provides  income  stability  for  farms,  while  at the  is  designed  to  discourage  excessive  electricity
same time relaxing and then eliminating production  (water)  consumption,  the  VPS  is designed  to dis-
controls.  The  program  links  the  support  price  a  courage excess  production  by  farmers.  While  the
farmer receives to the quantity of agricultural com-  utility companies are concerned with finding a price
modities produced. Farmers would not be told what  schedule  that leads to the efficient utilization  of its
or how  much to produce, and farmers would have  physical capacity (Tyndall; Billings and Agthe), the
more flexibility  in achieving an optimal allocation  VPS is concerned with finding a price schedule that
of  their  productive  resources  in  response  to  the  leads  to  a  more  efficient  allocation  of  resources
support  price.  The  objectives  of  the program  in-  within  the  agricultural  sector.  Such  an  allocation
clude:  (1)  controlling agricultural commodity pro-  would reduce  the  social  welfare  dead-weight  loss
duction  without  directly  imposing  production  associated with excess production under current ag-
restrictions  on a farm and hence  allowing farms  to  ricultural policy.
allocate  their resources  in an efficient manner,  (2)
providing income  stability  for family farms  during
the  transition  to  a  free  market,  and  (3)  limiting  Characteristics
government expenditures.  The  characteristics  of  the  VPS  program  to  be
The paper is divided into four sections.  The first  analyzed are:
section  describes  the  VPS  program.  The  second  (1) A schedule of declining support prices for each
section presents  a mathematical  estimation  model  commodity in the program will be offered to partic-
that determines  the support price schedule for each  ipants. In this schedule,  the support price  is mono-
crop in order to meet a given set of national produc-  tonically  reduced  for  each  additional  unit  of
tion goals. The third section presents an illustrative  production forthcoming. As shown in Figure  1, the
example that demonstrates the effects of the VPS on  highest  support  price  (IPi)  is  associated  with  the
commodity production,  government cost, farm in-  production  of the  first  unit  (wi)  of a  commodity
I  j  -I  /  i
i  =  Crop
T  - ---.----.----.----------------  ---  IPi  =  Initial  Price
TP,  =  Target  Price
Price
CP,  =  Current  Market
Price
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OPCF  --.--. _-____  --———————---__-  ---  qij  =  Target  Production
,  m,  q=  Marginal  Cost
1  2  3  4  qj  :  q.
Quantity
Figure 1. A Linear Declining Support Price to Reduce Crop Production  From a Farm.
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Figure 2.  A Linear Declining Support Price to Reduce Aggregate  Production  From QP to TQi.
produced  by  each  farm,  the  next highest  support  produced  on  the  farm.  Each  participating  farm
price will be paid for the next unit produced, etc. The  would  be  allowed  to  expand  or  reduce  cropland
support price for the last unit of production on most  acres.
farms will be less than the estimated market price so  (5) The program would be designed to be phased
that marginal production decisions will be made in  out gradually within a fixed time period (say 5,  10,
response to market signals.  or 20 years) to allow participants  adequate time to
(2)  Participation  is  voluntary.  The  participants  adjust to a free market environment  or retire from
may be required to comply with resource  conserva-  farming.  This adjustment period  would  give rural
tion for the enhancement of environmental  quality,  communities  time to absorb economic changes and
They  would  have  the  option  of  receiving  either  to adapt to technological progress in agriculture.
program support prices or market prices, whichever  (6) Prior  to each  crop year,  government econo-
is higher. The nonparticipants would have to sell on  mists  would  estimate  the  expected  production
the open market.  (TQi) and the  associated market equilibrium  price
(3) Only active farmers with crop base acreage and  for each commodity i (Figure 2). A declining farm-
whose farm income provides more than one-half of  level  support  price  schedule  for  all  major  crops
household income would be eligible to participate  would then be designed so that at a production equal
in the program. The current crop base yield (or an  to TQi,  marginal production  is determined  by  the
estimated efficient yield) would be used to compute  market  price,  not  the  support  price.2 The  price
program  payments  to each individual  farmer. Each  schedule would be set so that for a given sized farm,
farmer can grow any crop on his or her land.  the  marginal  support  price  will  be  less  than  the
(4) The right to receive support payments is asso-  anticipated market price. The relationships between
ciated with an individual farmer and is not transfer-  the  target production  level  TQi  that is  the sum  of
able to other farmers  or to future generations.  This  production over all farms, market equilibrium price
restriction  is needed  to ensure that the government  that  will  be  used  as a  target  price  (TPi),  current
benefits are not capitalized into a farm's land value.'  market price (CPi), and the declining support price
Payments could be received only for commodities  under a VPS program are illustrated in Figure 2. The
1 If the benefits  were capitalized  into the value of the cropland,  a barrier to entry into farming  would be created. An in-depth
discussion of targeting benefits  to farmers can be found in Heady et al.
20ne could attempt to control production using the VPS by setting the price schedule so that at TQi the target price equaled the
expected market price.  In this presentation,  we assume that the target production level, TQi, and the market price can be estimated by
using estimated demand  and supply functions. We take the liberty of setting the target price,  TPi, equal to the market price.
135current  market  price  CPi is  lower  than  the  target  (Lederer and Pollack). Similar  legislation could be
price  TPi  because  the  current  production  level  is  enacted  to ensure adherence to the intent of a VPS
assumed to be larger than the target production level.  program.
As production increases,  the price decreases.  These observations  suggest that a change from the
current farm income support program could become
Shortcomings  a  reality.  If such  a  change  takes  place,  the  VPS
Although  conceptually  the  VPS  program  to  be  program could be considered as a viable alternative.
analyzed  could be an alternative  farm program  to
control production,  some difficulties  are associated  DETERMINATION  OF VPS SCHEDULES
with the acceptance and implementation of the pro-  In this section, the determination of VPS schedules
gram.  in  :  is described. A number of simplifying assumptions
~~~~~These  include:  ^are  made to facilitate the discussion.  In determining
(1)  The political acceptability of a major revi-  the  VPS  schedules,  assume  that each  farm  in  the
sion of commodity programs,  U.S. can be grouped by size into one ofj classes. All
(2) The ability of government  economists to  farms in each size class are assumed to be homoge-
forecast agricultural production accurately,  neous.  The  VPS  schedule of each  crop  i for each
(3) The identification of full-time producers,  farm  in  each  size  group j  is defined as  a function
(4) The targeting of program benefits  to exist-  Pi(ai,qij),  where qij is the quantity of crop i produced
ing producers  only, and  by a farm in size class j and ai is the parameter(s) of
(5) The determination  of support prices that  the  price  function,  (a  ), to  be estimated.  The
are acceptable to both small and large pro-  estimation procedure is composed of two parts. The
ducers.  first part involves  the development of a farm-level
decision model, which is used to simulate farm-level
Some of  those  shortcomings  are  becoming  less Some  of those  shortcomings  are  becoming  less  production  in response to  various  VPS  schedules.
serious.  Perhaps te most important change taking serious.  Perhaps te most important change taking  The second part involves the use of the farm decision
place is the growing political awareness of the need  model to estimate  simultaneously the parameters  a
for a lessening of trade barriers by members  of the  of the VPS schedules. These parameters define a set
Generalized  Agreement  for  Tariffs  and  Trade (Generalized AgreAement  for  Tareiffs  and  Trade  iof  support price schedules  that would generate ag- (GATT). The GATT members are currently discuss- (GATT).TheGATTmembersarecurrentlydiscuss-  gregate production levels that meet the target levels.
ing reductions  in agricultural supports.  Some mem- 
bers  have  proposed  interim  support  (decoupling)roduction  Decision  Model
programs, in which financial support is provided for
farmers while the agricultural sector undergoes the  Assume that in response to a given VPS schedule,
transition from current agricultural support systems  a farm in group j will determine its production level,
to a free market.  qij, by maximizing its net farm income, NIj. This can
In addition, the tools available for economic fore-  be expressed as:
casts are constantly being improved. If an adequate  I
information  set is provided, predictions of agricul-  (1)  NIj =  J  [Pi (i,qij)  - Cij (qij)  ] dqij,
tural  production  can  be  sufficiently  accurate  i= 
(Brandt;  Just and Rausser)  to permit the estimation  where  Cij(qij)  is  a  marginal  cost  function  for  the
of a price schedule  that will not interfere  with mar-  production of crop i at level qi,  and  i(qij) is the production of crop i at level  qij, and  ai,qij) is the
ginal production  decisions.  VPS schedule for crop i. The price received for a unit
The  identification  of  full-time  farmers  and  the  of productiondetermined  theparameterand of production  is determined  by the parameter  ai and
targeting of benefits to these producers could be the  quantity  produced  qij.  The  difference,
most difficult problems  associated with  the imple-  p  (Aqij)  aociated 
mentation of a VPS program. The division of larger 
farms into smaller farms could undermine the intent  w  c  .
of a  VPS  program,  raising  government  costs  and  Thequantityof a commodity i producedby a farm
in group j is determined  by the available cropland increasing  agricultural production.  These problems  n group J  determined  by  theava  le cropland
are  not insurmountable.  In  1987,  Congress  passed  (A), the crop yield (Yij) of crop i, and the portion of
the Budget Reconciliation  Act. This law limits the  croplanddevoted  to that commodity Tj. That is:
number of farming operations,  owned by a person  (2)  qij = 'ijYijAj.
or legal entity, that are eligible to receive payments.  Because the sum of the proportion of land in each
In addition,  the  law requires  individuals  to be en-  farm devoted to producing the various crops cannot
gaged actively  in  farming  in  order  to be  eligible  exceed  1, the following restriction  is needed:
136I  An Estimation Model for VPS Schedules
(3)  C tij <  1 for all j.  A procedure to estimate ai, given expected aggre-
pi= A  gate  national production,  is described  below.  The
Thus,  given  a VPS  schedule Pi(,qij), where  ai is  procedure uses the farm production  decision model
known,  a  farmer determines  his  production  level  and an iterative estimation method.
qij, by maximizing objective function (1), subject to  The  first  step is  to  choose an  appropriate  func-
constraints (2) and (3).  tional form  for the  VPS  schedule.  The functional
The total quantity  Qi of crop i produced  can be  form selected should have the properties necessary
estimated by assuming that each farm  in size group  to channel government benefits to the targeted farm
j has an identical production response to a given VPS  groups. Figure 3 displays some functions that could
schedule. That is:  be used. A flat function (constant support price) will
^~~~~~~~~J  ~convey  large benefits to large farms, while the other
(4)  Qi=  Njqij for all i,  three  functions  presented,  a  concave  declining,  a
j=1  linear (constant)  declining, and a convex declining
function, will direct more program benefits to small
where Nj is the number of farms in size group j.  farms as compared with the flat function.
The government payment to a farm  in size group  Once the  form  of the function  Pi(ai,qij)  has  been
j, (EXj),  under the VPS  schedule can be calculated  specified,  a set of initial  values  of ai is used  as a
as:  starting point. The initial  values used depend upon
I  the function selected. For instance, the initial values
(5)  EXj =  [Pi (a,qj)  - i]  dq,  of slopes to be estimated for the constant declining
i = i  support price schedules are determined by the initial
prices, equilibrium prices, and number of farms. The
where TPi is expected target price. Total government  farm decision model is then employed to determine
cost, TEX, can then be calculated  as the sum of the  the production  level, qij, of farms in each size class.
individual payments,  Crop production  is summed  over all  farms  to get
J  Qi. The Qi is then compared with the target produc-
(6)  TEX = A  NjEXj.  tion level TQi. If the difference,  (TQi - Qi), for each
j = i  commodity  is not significant (less than  1 percent of
the previous value for each commodity), the final set
4 
3.5 --  Flat
3  - _  Concave
2.5
2  2
a  5  0+  Convex
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0410  12  1418
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Figure 3.  Four Possible VPS Schedules:  Flat,  Linear, Exponential Concave, and  Exponential Convex.
137Table  1. Number Of  Farms,  Acreage, Crop Yield, And  Production Cost Per Farm-size Group In The U.S.
Number
Average  of Farms
Farm  Acreage  (Nj)  Yield  Production Costa
Group J  Farm Size  (Aj)  (x 1000)  (Yij)  (Cij)
corn  soybeans  wheat  corn  soybeans  wheat
----  acres  - --  Number  ------- bu--------  ----- $/bu- -------
1  100-139  120  67  101  28  34  1.87  3.99  3.19
2  140-179  160  69  102  30  33  1.84  3.91  3.12
3  180-219  200  50  102  30  35  1.80  3.82  3.06
4  220-259  240  48  104  31  34  1.76  3.73  2.98
5  260-499  280  161  107  27  34  1.72  3.64  2.91
6  500-999  750  97  110  31  34  1.68  3.57  2.86
7  1000-1999  1500  57  111  30  35  1.65  3.50  2.80
8  2000  and >  2500  32  110  28  33  1.65  3.50  2.80
Total  622
a The  production costs in  Table  1  are derived  from a 1982 base solution of the NRE  LP model. (Huang  et al.,  1987).
These costs are assumed to be constant regardless of farm size from  the study by Miller and Rodewald.
of parameters  is  considered found.  Otherwise,  the  The 1982 census data (U.S.  Department of Com-
set of parameters, the ails, is adjusted.  A new set of  merce)  were used to estimate the number of farms
parameters  is computed on the basis of the inverse  and average crop yield of corn, soybeans, and wheat
relationship  between  ai  values  and  quantity  pro-  by  size  class.  Table  1 delineates  these  data  and
duced. These parameters  are then used  in the farm  provides the approximate  number of farms  produc-
production decision model for the next iteration. The  ing corn, soybeans,  and wheat in the U.S. The data
iterative  process  continues  until  a  suitable  set of  in Table  1 illustrate the properties of the VPS pro-
ai's is found.  grams.  In the illustrative  example presented,  farms
The estimation  procedure  outlined above can be  in the two smallest size classes3 were not considered
extended to determine a support price schedule that  eligible  for  participation  in  the  program  because
will satisfy both a government farm program budget  these farms are more likely to be operated by part-
and a target production level. However, this proce-  time  farmers  with  off-farm  income  as  the  major
dure can become difficult to use as more constraints  income source.  They  would, therefore,  not qualify
are added.  for participation.
In this example,  the VPS schedule, Pi(ai,qij),  was
AN ILLUSTRATIVE  EXAMPLE  also assumed to be a linear function. Cost was also
To  understand  the features  of the  VPS  program  assumed linear,  yielding  a quadratic  programming
best,  it  is useful  to conduct  a simulation  exercise.  base model. The base model was  solved using  the
The example selected demonstrates  that a VPS can  Generalized  Algebraic  Modeling  System,  GAMS
be  used to reduce  surplus production  accumulated  (Kendrick and Meeraus), to estimate the production
under the Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA). Because  response for all farms in each farm size for all crops.
the objective  of this example is to illustrate general  The production response was based on the assump-
features  of a  VPS  program  in contrast with  other  tion  that all  farms  maximize  their  net returns.  As
programs,  several  simplifying  assumptions  are  noted previously,  an iterative procedure was used to
made  to facilitate the exposition.  The general  con-  estimate the VPS function (schedule) and the asso-
clusions  obtained from  the  analysis  should not be  ciated production  level  for each  of the three crops
affected by the assumptions.  for each farm size.
3 According  to 1982 Census data, there are approximately  180 thousand farms in these two classes, which represent 22 percent
of the total farms in the U.S. However, the production shares in the U.S. from these two classes are not significant:  6 percent for both
corn and soybeans, respectively,  and  4 percent for wheat.
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Figure 4. Production  Reduction  Under a VPS Program.
Using VPS  to Reduce  Surplus Production  tional acreage constraints were added to ensure that
all farms met set-aside requirements.
The current farm program  (FSA) uses a combina-  To build a farm decision model for a VPS program,
tion  of  flat  loan  rates,  target  prices,  and  acreage  the equilibrium  production  level and  the price  for
set-aside requirements  to support farm income and  each  crop  under the absence of the FSA for  1986
influence  commodity  production.4 The conceptual  were estimated. Demand and supply equations were
relationship between the VPS and the FSA is shown  estimated  for  each  crop  using  constant  elasticity
in Figure 4.  functions,  the  1986  production  level,  and  1986
prices.5 Each pair of demand and supply  functions
To highlight the differences between the VPS and  was then solved to obtain the equilibrium production
current programs,  it was necessary  to build a con-  and  price.  The estimated  equilibrium  production
ceptual FSA model because  the data necessary  for  and price  were used as the target production level,
the construction  of a model  that accurately  reflects  (TQi), and the target market price, TPi, as shown in
the effect of the FSA on different  farm-size groups  Figure 4.
were not available. To build the FSA model, we used  The  base model  with a  constant declining  VPS
constant  target (initial) price as  the VPS  schedule,  schedule  was  built  to  determine  the  initial  price,
that  is Pi(ai,qij)  = constant  ki  for all j,  in the  base  IPi, and the slope ai. A set of IPi and ai was obtained
model.  Consequently,  this model was  a linear pro-  for each  crop.  The  criterion  used in  building  this
gramming  model,  and it was  used to estimate pro-  VPS  schedule  was  that  net  farm  income  of  the
duction response  from  each  farm-size  group.  The  smallest sized farms  must be at least twice as large
model  used  1986  production  levels  (Q?),  market  as the net income received under the FSA. Because
prices (CPi), and current target prices (CTPi). Addi-  there were two parameters to be estimated,  the esti-
4 Under the 1985 Food  Security Act, farmers cannot increase yield on acreage  bases for program payment.  In reality,  farmers
often have actual crop yield greater than allowable base yield.
5 The demand and supply elasticities  used were: -.33 and .32, respectively, for corn, -. 27 and .75 for soybeans, and -. 22 and .48
for wheat (Green and Price; Lowry et al., Helmberger and Akinyosoye; Lee and Helmberger).  These elasticities  were used to
construct supply and demand  functions of those three crops. The computed  1986 equilibrium production and prices  are 7.3 billion
bushels and $2.11 per bushel for corn, 2.01 billion bushels and $4.68 per bushel for soybeans, and 1.90 billion bushels and $2.85 per
bushel for wheat.
139Table 2.  Estimated VPS Schedules And Constant  for the FSA and VPS programs. As shown in Table
Target  Prices Under FSA.  3,  the net farm income  for a farm in  group  1 was
twice as large under the VPS program as under the
CotEstimated  VPS Schedule  P  arget  FSA.  In contrast,  a  farm  in  the  largest group  (8) Estimated VPS Schedule  Price Under FSA
received  net income  of  $14,000  under  the  VPS,
Commodity  ($/bu.)  _  ($/bu.)  while receiving $132,000 under the FSA. The total
Corn  3.65 -0.00016 qij  3.03  government payments to farmers were estimated to
Soybeans  4.69 -0.00013 q2 j  4.77  be $7 billion under the VPS program, compared with
Wheat  4.55 - 0.0031  q3j  4.34  $17 billion  under the FSA. It should be noted that
estimated  government  payments  were  larger  than
mation process became somewhat difficult. To sim-  the $14 billion reported (U.S. Bureau of the Census)
plify  the estimation, only  the slope ai was varied to  for all crops in 1986. This result is due to the use of
obtain  the target production TQi, and the slope and  the simplifying assumption that all crop production
TQi  was allowed  to determine the intercept (initial  in  1986 received deficiency payments.
price).6 The FSAin this study assumed that each farm idled
~~~Results  ~some  proportion of its cropland acreage.  About 37
percent  of  cropland  was  idled  in  each  farm-size
The estimated VPS schedules are shown  in Table  group  under  the FSA.  Consequently  the marginal
2.  Table  3 shows  net farm income,  marginal  land  land values  are zero  for all groups. Under the VPS
values,  and  marginal  price  supports  by  farm-size  program, however,  the small  and moderately  sized
group under both the FSAand VPS programs. In this  farms  (in farm-size  groups from  1 to  5)  fully used
example  a constant  declining  VPS  price schedule  their cropland, while farms in farm-size groups from
was  used  for each  commodity  to remove program  6  to  8  only  used  73,  37,  and  25  percent  of their
production  incentives  beyond the  market  equilib-  cropland,  respectively.  The  marginal  land  values
rium level,  TQi, and to discourage excess produc-  decline as farm  size increases.
tion.  Figure  4  demonstrates  how  a VPS  program
would reduce  production  from Q?,  under  the FSA,  The production  response  from  each  group  also
to  TQi.  At  this  point,  market  equilibrium  prices  differs  significantly  between  FSA  and  VPS  pro-
determine  marginal  production.  When  the  market  grams  For example,  while the  total production  of
moves from  a surplus  situation  to  an  equilibrium  cornunderVPSwasreducedby  percentromthe
condition, society gains  (F+G),  which is the social  production level  under the FSA, a large production
welfare dead-weight loss caused by the surplus.  t  welfare dead-weight  loss caused by the surplus.  increase  in  small  farms  was  indicated.  This result
The net farm  income  received by  an  individual  implies that while we reduce the production surplus
farm  in each  group also was significantly  different  of  underthe  programtheproductionfrom
Table 3. Some  Results Of Using  A Variable  Price Support  (VPS)  Program  To Reduce Surplus Under The
Current  Farm  Program  (FSA)  For  1986.
Farm-  Marginal  Marginal Support  Crop  Production
Size  Net Income  Land Value  Prices Under VPS  Corn  Soybeans  Wheat
Group  FSA  VPS  FSA  VPS  Corn  Soybeans  Wheat  FSA  VPS  FSA  VPS  FSA  VPS
($1000)  ($/acre)  ----- ($/bu.)-  -(-  ------------ (1000 bu.)  ------------
1  4  11  0  44  2.91  4.69  4.23  2.8  9.1  0.7  0.0  0.8  1.0
2  8  11  0  34  2.06  4.69  3.91  3.8  9.9  1.0  0.0  1.0  2.0
3  10  13  0  24  1.99  4.60  3.73  4.8  10.0  1.3  0.7  1.3  2.6
4  11  14  0  23  1.95  4.47  3.66  5.8  11.0  1.6  1.7  1.5  2.9
5  13  14  0  22  1.88  4.41  3.52  7.0  11.0  1.6  2.1  1.8  3.3
6  39  14  0  0  1.68  3.57  2.86  19.0  13.0  4.9  8.6  4.8  5.4
7  81  14  0  0  1.65  3.50  2.81  39.0  13.0  9.5  9.1  9.9  5.6
8  132  14  0  0  1.65  3.50  2.86  64.0  13.0  15.0  9.1  16.0  5.6
6 It should be noted that the estimated price schedules  are just one combination of many possible schedules that can achieve
objectives  of surplus reduction  and income support to a small farm.
140small farms is not restricted as under the FSA pro-  contribute significantly to the reduction of trade-dis-
gram.  torting policy because it would provide a free market
environment  where  marginal  national  production SOME IMPLICATIONS OF A VPS SOME IMPLICATIONS OF A VPS  would respond solely to market forces.
U~PROGR~AM  ~  While no clear agreements have been reached on
We have demonstrated that a VPS program could  which domestic policies would be acceptable to all
be  used  efficiently  to  reduce  the  production  sur-  nations, "decoupled" payments have been discussed
pluses  that  arise  under  the  current  farm program  as a non-trade-distorting  policy.7 However,  a truly
(FSA). In this section, some of the long-term impli-  decoupled income support system has not been seen
cations of a VPS program for income stabilization,  as  acceptable  by many  participants  in  agricultural
international  trade,  farm  structure,  and natural  re-  trade  negotiations.  One  suggestion  that  addresses
source conservation  are discussed.  some concerns about decoupled payments has been
the Production  Entitlement Guarantees  (PEG) pro-
Income Stability  gram (Blandford).
The VPS program  could provide a minimum  in-  A PEG  program permits  each  nation to  provide
come support for farmers. When commodity prices  support payments for a limited prespecified amount
decline unexpectedly,  the price received for the ini-  of agricultural production.  A VPS program is com-
tial unit of production is protected,  thereby protect-  parable to a PEG program because  the quantity of
ing  farm income.  By setting  the marginal  support  production receiving support payments is estimated
price below the expected market price, large produc-  when the price schedule  is determined. In addition,
ers will be encouraged  to sell a sizable portion of  however,  a VPS program provides more flexibility
their production on the open market rather than turn  than a PEG program because it provides negotiators
it over to the government. This introduction of mar-  with the ability to set total government payments to
ket forces  into the agricultural  sector  will lead  to  producers  as  well  as  the  quantity  of agricultural
more  efficient production  decisions  at the  margin.  production  receiving  payments.  A  VPS  program
When demand rises, idled farmland could be freely  also recognizes  the fact that a primary objective of
brought back into production  in response  to rising  many domestic agricultural policies is farm income
market prices  because the  VPS  program  does  not  support. By using a VPS program, domestic agricul-
impose production  restrictions.  The VPS therefore  tural policies (as noted above) can be designed that
permits the agricultural sector to respond to market  target  support payments  to  small  farms  requiring
forces  while  protecting  the  farmers  against  unex-  income assistance.
pected drops in commodity demand.
The VPS  should  be considered a transitory  pro-  Farm Structure
gram to a free market. The program could eliminate  The VPS program could provide the government
a  portion  of the  income  instability  that  would  be  with  a  policy  tool  to  promote  a  change  in  farm
associated  with  the  adjustment  resulting  from  an  structure  and  induce  increased  production  effi-
abrupt change from a commodity support program  ciency.  This  objective  could  be  obtained  by
to  a  free  market  system.  Over  a period  of time,  designing a VPS program to provide market signals
farmers  would  need  either  to  increase  their  effi-  to farmers by allowing them to respond to prevailing
ciency  or to retire,  but income  stability  would  be  market prices. Inefficient farmers who rely on gov-
provided for their transition to a free market.  ernment payments to continue operations  would be
able  to  observe  the  market  conditions  and  make
International Trade  adjustments to become more efficient and competi-
An  increasing  number  of agricultural  trade  dis-  tive.  Increased  efficiency  could  be  obtained  by
agreements and rapidly  rising government  agricul-  changing the size of agricultural operations, reduc-
tural support payments have lead the OECD nations  ing the use of inputs, or producing a different set of
to call for a lessening of trade-distorting agricultural  commodities. Because transfers of VPS benefits are
policies. Trade-distorting policies include domestic  not permitted either between  farms or generations,
price supports and the measures used to dispose of  and because  the  program  has  a  limited  duration,
agricultural surpluses in international trade that re-  inefficient  farmers  will  have  to  adjust  their farm
sult  from  price  supports.  A  VPS  program  could  operations or leave farming.
7  Decoupled income support payments are government payments  to agricultural producers that are not linked to agricultural
production.  Under a decoupled support system, producers  would receive a government income support payment regardless  of their
decision to grow crops. Actual production decisions would be based upon prevailing  or expected market conditions.
141Resource  Conservation  tion on marginal cropland would end for all farmers.
Government agricultural and environmental  pro-  As cropland leaves agriculture, producers  could be
grams have frequently had conflicting effects. Tar-  encouraged  to place the land into conserving  uses
get prices and loan rates above the prevailing market  by providing  assistance  with land conversion  and
price  have  encouraged  agricultural  production  on  maintenance costs. Programs of this nature, such as
increasingly marginal  land, while at the same time  the Conservation  Reserve Program  (USDA 1987),
conservation programs have tried to reduce erosion  already exist and are amenable to a VPS program.
and to  improve water quality.  The FSA and Water  CONCLUSIONS
Quality Act (WQA) (U.S. Congress) were designed
to eliminate a number of these conflicts.  The FSA  Ths paper  analyzes  a VPS  farm  program  as an
reduced loan rates and target prices,  fixed program  alternative to the current farm income support pro-
yields, and established penalties for expanding pro-  gram. The VPS program could provide a means for
duction  into  erosive  or  environmentally  sensitive  the  government  to  provide  a  transition  to  a  free
areas, while the WQA provided states with the reg-  market  environment,  reduce  trade-distorting  agri-
ulatory authority to limit agricultural practices.  cultural  policies,  increase  economic  efficiency  in
A VPS  program  would  be  consistent  with  the  the agricultural sector, distribute the program bene-
continued elimination of conflicts between agricul-  fits to smaller, more  financially troubled  farms, re-
tural  and  environmental  programs.  The  use  of  a  duce  excess  commodity  production,  stabilize
constant program yield would remove the incentive  come, and limit government expenditures on farm
for small farms  to increase crop yields through  the  programs.  While a VPS farm program  provides an
heavy application of agricultural chemicals and lead  alternative tocurrent farm programs, some practical
to a reduction in the use of these agents.  During the  problems  would have  to be addressed prior to  the
duration of the program, producers would no longer  implementation  of a VPS program. This paper pro-
receive deficiency payments. This would reduce the  vdes the basis for a discussion that can be used by
incentive  for larger producers  to maintain produc-  producers,  consumers,  and government officials to
tion  on marginal cropland.  After the VPS program  examine the potential of a VPS program as an alter-
ends,  government payment  incentives  for produc-  native agricultural policy.
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